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Dualism Vs. Materialism Term Paper

MIND THEORY: NAGEL VS. DENNETT Dualism vs. Materialism

The theory of mind is probably one of the most challenging areas of philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience we will ever have to face, because it involves, depending on the approach or view taken, thinking about or quantifying the process of thinking. Neither introspection nor neuroscience has provided definitive answers to what the mind is, although this remains an active area of debate and research.

Dennett's view of mind theory will probably have more in common with the future direction of neuroscience research and therefore be more relevant and testable.

Dualism vs. Materialism

Generally speaking, philosophers can be grouped into dualists and materialists. Dualists believe the mind is an entity separate from our physical nature and even though it is still currently impossible to measure the mind using scientific instruments, this limitation doesn't mean the mind doesn't exist (reviewed by Ramsey, 2007, Section 3). Materialists, or eliminativists, argue that what we experience as thinking or consciousness is nothing more than our nervous system providing a means for us to interpret and react to the world and the existence of a mind need not be invoked. Arguments for and against...

To argue this point Nagel discussed the ability of bats to navigate their environment through echo-location and since we can't echo-locate it would be impossible for us to fully understand the conscious experiences of a bat. In proposing this argument, Nagel makes the assumption that creatures are capable of subjective experiences. Although many scientists and philosophers may agree with this assumption it represents a leap from sensory experiences to the process of mentation without an explanation of how the connection is made. Human minds, according to Nagel's viewpoint, are unique only because our means for interacting with…

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Allen, Colin. (2010). Animal Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October 9, 2011 from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/

Clark, Andy. (2002). Minds, brains, and tools. In H. Clapin (Ed.), Philosophy of Mental Representation (pp. 66-90). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Ramsey, William. (2007). Eliminative Materialism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October 9, 2011 from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/
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